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Job Creation: A Post-Mortem? 
The Reagan Administration has proposed 
cuts in many programs, but few are to be cut 
as deeply as the Labor Department's "job 
creation" effort-programs designed to en-
courage employment through the subsidiza-
tion of employee wages. For fiscal  1982, the 
White House plans to cut $3.6 billion out of 
these programs, or almost one-tenth of its 
total proposed reductions; 
With the nation's unemployment rate stuck 
near 7112  percent for most of the past year, 
critics argue that dismantl ing these programs 
could seriously jeopardize the uneasy peace 
with the unemployed in central cities. The 
Administration, on the other hand, argues 
that the programs are growing out of con-
trol, as well as posing serious management 
problems. Behind the political controversy, 
however, is an important economic debate 
concerning the usefulness of job-creation 
programs as a remedy for employment 
problems. 
The programs 
The notion that governments can and should 
directly stimulate employment is not new. 
Indeed, today's Federal job-creation pro-
grams can be traced to the work-rei ief and 
public-works programs of  the Great Depres-
sion, which at their peak in 1938 employed 
nearly four million workers. The urban riots 
of the 1960's and the high unemployment 
rates of  the 1970's later stimulated re-
newed interest in programs to counter 
the chronic unemployment problems of 
unskilled workers. 
By the early 1970's, nearly 20 Federal jobs 
programs were in operation, involving both 
training projects and direct job creation. In 
1973 these efforts were consolidated by the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act (CETA). In contrast to the programs it 
replaced, CETA provided for decentralized 
administration. Federal funds were channel-
ed to prime sponsors-largely county and 
city governments-who then became re-
sponsible for providing training and creating 
job opportunities. 
The programs and aims ofCETA shifted signi-
ficantly overtime. Initially, ittried primarily to 
solve long-run or "structural" unemploy-
ment problems, by preparing individuals for 
the workforce through training and work-
experience programs. Direct job creation-
the focus of  our  discussion -represented less 
than a third of  total spending in the early 
1970's. However, as unemployment rates 
rose during the 1974-75 recession, the em-
phasis shifted to countercyclical job creation. 
.  As a result, this type of spending increased 
from $440 million in 1974 to $6.3 billion in 
1979, or 60 percent of the CETA budget. At 
the peak of  the public service employment 
effort, almost 700,000 jobs had been created 
by CETA subsidies. 
Theory of job creation 
Or had they? Does a government have the 
ability-even theoretically-to "create" 
jobs through subsidization of an employee's 
wages? The answer depends upon the struc-
ture and functioning of  the labor market. 
Proponents of job programs argue that the 
labor market is segmented, with different sup-
ply and demand processes for the ski lied and 
unskilled segments. For skilled workers, 
movements in wage rates clear the market for 
their skills, so that few of  them become invol-
untarily unemployed except during severe 
recessions. For unskilled workers, on the 
other hand, market imperfections (especially, 
some argue, the minimum wage) keep wages 
artificially high. This prevents the market 
for their services from clearing at prevailing 
wages, leading to high and relatively perma-
nent levels of involuntary unemployment. 
A public-service employment program, ac-
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general inflationary pressures on wages; this 
would be achieved by identifying and hiring 
those workers who were unable to get a job at 
the prevailing wage. (The same effect could 
be achieved by subsidizing a private employ-
er to hire these individuals.) In this view, jobs 
can be "created": by circumventing the mar-
ket imperfection, the program increases 
employment of unskilled workers without af-
fecting the employment of others, for a net 
increase in employment and output. 
Rejecting this "segmented markets" view, 
opponents of job creation argue that market 
imperfections are a relatively unimportant 
influence on unemployment. Rather, high 
unemployment rates among unskilled work-
ers are seen to be the result of  the high iob-
turnover rates inherent to these markets. 
Therefore, the wages of unskilled workers 
clear the market for thei r services, and any 
increase in demand resulting from job-
creation programs only increases the wages 
paid these workers (relative to the wages of 
skilled workers). This in turn tends to reduce 
the private sector's demand for unskilled 
labor. In the extreme, therefore, a jobs pro-
gram might simply convert private-sector 
employment into public-sector employment 
one-for-one, with no net job creation -but 
with an adverse effect on wage inflation. 
Targeting problems 
Such theoretical considerations have un-
doubtedly contributedto the lack of enthu-
siasm for job creation among Administration 
pol  icymakers. But the efficacy of job creation 
programs can be questioned on operational 
grounds as well. For example, there is the 
difficulty of "targeting" job-creation expen-
ditures on the individuals suffering employ-
ment problems. Market forces tend to cause 
inaccurate targeting of program expendi-
tures. If  the subsidized jobs pay the prevailing 
wage (or greater), they will attract individuals 
who have no employment problems, and the 
impact on the target group will be lost. This 
tendency would be weakened if subsidized 
jobs paid significantly less than the prevail-
ing unskilled wage, but this is typically not 
the case.  . 
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The architects of CETA tried to solve the tar-
geting problem by defining a set of eligibility 
criteria to identify truly disadvantaged work-
ers. There is evidence to suggest, however, 
that despite these criteria, low-ski  II workers 
were not well represented among those in 
CETA job slots. Indeed, a 1977 study found 
that those receiving CETA  public~service em-
ployment tended to be better educated than 
the experienced labor force as a whole; 76 
percent of those in CETA job slots had 12 or 
more years of education, versus 71  percent 
for the experienced labor force. (Minorities 
did, however, tend to be better represented in 
CETA jobs.) 
A related problem is the tendency by employ-
ers to use the funds to hire people that they 
would have hired anyway. The effect ofthis 
"fiscal substitution effect" is to convert the 
jobs program into a general-purpose subsidy 
to the employer. 
This problem is difficult to handle through 
eligibility criteria or other administrative 
means, because an employer usually is better 
qualified than a jobs-program administrator 
to judge the potential value of an individual 
in a particular job-and hence what should 
be paid. Even without a subsidy, an employer 
might be quite willing to hire an individual 
who superficially appears to be in need 
of assistance. 
Under CETA, employers apparently have 
found it easy to convert conventional em-
ployment to subsidized employment. In one 
study, economists George Johnson and James 
Tomola found almost perfect fiscal substitu-
. tion among state-and-Iocal government em-
ployers-after only six quarters, virtually all 
of  the public-service slots had replaced con-
ventional positions, leaving total employ-
ment unaffected. In effect, CETA uninten-
tionally became a revenue-sharing program 
for public employers. 
Youth problem 
In view of  these considerations, many econo-
mists see job-creation efforts as an unprom-
ising method of dealing with the overall 
unemployment problem. Towards the end of the Carter Administration, in fact, Congress 
itself had begun shifting the emphasis of  CETA 
away from public-service employment. 
Some enthusiasm remains, however, for the 
use of  this approach in dealingwith the youth 
unemployment problem -partly because of 
its severity (with 40-percent unemployment 
rates among minority youth) and partly be-
cause of the belief that market imperfections 
may be more important in youth labor mar-
kets. For this reason, the Carter Administra-
tion in 1980 sought to channel more CETA 
funds toward youthful workers. 
Some economists are skeptical, however, 
that the "segmented markets" notion is op-
erative even for youth. High unemployment 
among teenagers may reflect not only the 
wage rigidities created by the minimum 
wage and other market imperfections, 
but also young workers' (voluntarily) high 
job-tu rnover rates and lengthy job-search 
patterns. Such behavior may in turn be stimu-
lated by improved nonwork income oppor-
tunities, particularly family-assistance 
(welfare) programs. 
Both points of view may have some rele-
vance. Many studies have found an associa-
tion between the minimum wage and youth 
employment, suggesting the existence of a 
certain amount of "market segmentation." 
The association is far from perfect, however, 
and other forces appear to be at work. In 
addition, some direct support for the "vol-
untary turnover" view comes from recently 
completed welfare experiments (the Seattle 
and Denver Income Maintenance Experi-
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studied the effects of family-income guaran-
tees that were 25 to 30 percent more gene-
rous than conventional welfare programs. 
Economist Richard West of SRI International 
found that these experimental programs re-
duced the work effort of youth by 33 to 43 
percent. These results suggest that it may 
be difficult for job-creation programs 
to significantly affect the youth unemploy-
ment problem. 
Future of job creation 
Overall, the theoretical uncertainties and 
practical difficulties involved with job crea-
tion have raised questions about the efficacy 
of such programs as a general remedy for 
hardcore unemployment. At the very least, 
the Carter Administration's ambitious plan to 
create one million jobs through such pro-
grams would not have the support today 
among labor economists and policymakers 
that it had in 1977. And in the short term, the 
Reagan Administration has made it clear that 
it is switching the emphasis of  unemployment 
policy-from job  creation to job training and 
fiscal reform, and from the public sector to 
private business and unions. 
Nevertheless, job creation is a durable con-
cept, made durable perhaps by the memory 
of the extensive Great Depression programs 
which did appear to "work" -albeit under 
radically different labor-market conditions. If 
unemployment does not yield to the new 
Administration's initiatives, job creation may 
return to the top of the labor-policy agenda 
once again. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 










































Dollar  Percent 
10,475  7.6 
10,074  8.6 
3,456  10.1 
5,461  11.7 
- 1,426  - 5.9 
787  89.9 
84  1.3 
321  2.1 
- 1,889  - 4.4 
- 1,859  6.1 
4,269  16.3 
12,915  19.8 
12,870  22.9 
7,682  32.9 
Weekended  Comparable 
4/29/81  year-ago periOd 
n.a.  78 
400.8  34 
n.a.  44 
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